



share and move to face nasty bugs

SECURITY, SECRECY AND TRANSPARENCY IN PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

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A MATTER OF POLICY

The ASSET FINAL EVENT

*Share and move for mobilization and mutual learning at local,
national and international levels on Science in Society related issues
in epidemics and pandemics
Rome, 30-31.10.2017*

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Security, Secrecy and Transparency in Public Health Emergency Management

- Problem
- Case: H5N1
- Key learning from ASSET
- New challenges
- References





THE PROBLEM

- Trade-off between secrecy and transparency in intentionally caused outbreaks
- «Dread risk»: Public fear of biological attacks
 - Hard to determine the nature of the event
- Dual-use research
- State and non-state actors





CASE: H5N1

- Virologists from the USA and the Netherlands
- Two articles about mutation possibilities for H5N1
Transmissible to – and between – mammals
- Fear: Terrorists start mutating their own virus for use on humans?
- Issue debated between several stakeholders for 8 months
- Result: Published and openly available (2012)
- Precedential decision?
- Researchers encouraged to publish (or perish...)





Key Learning from ASSET D2.6

- **Collection** and **analysis** of the **main policy documents concerning Intentionally Caused Outbreaks** and a **taxonomy** of the **main governance problems** posed by the risk of Intentionally Caused Outbreaks in democratic societies, chiefly
 - **the tension between secrecy and transparency,**
 - freedom of research and security,
 - citizen involvement and
 - experts' decisions.





Key learning (1)

- Intentionally caused outbreaks have occurred several times throughout history. Identified ca. 300BC – present time.
- Non-state actors are often portrayed as the biggest fear, but very difficult to assess the actual threat.
- Uncertainties about state BW programmes and stockpiles.
 - Most discontinued after 1975 BWC implemented.
 - But what about «brain drain», researchers and stockpiles?
- Dual-use issues concerning:
 - Research
 - Items (goods, technology, software etc.)





Key learning (2)

Laboratory safety and security

- Need for biorisk management systems

Healthcare systems

- Need surveillance and assessment of epidemiological development
- Awareness of clues for detecting biological attacks




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




Key learning (3)

Intentionally caused outbreaks, particularly bioterrorism, is a sensitive topic, and can cause fear and miscommunication.

Interaction with the public is essential.





Key learning (4)

Communication:

- ...is key:
 - ❖ Threat-, risk- and crisis communication
 - ❖ Transparency and honesty (without compromising sensitive details)
 - ❖ Address the public before, during and after an outbreak to avoid dread risks and fear
- So is mitigation:
 - ❖ Many policy documents exist to deal with – and mitigate – issues.
 - ❖ Best practices exist and can be applied
 - ❖ There needs to be a balance between secrecy and transparency, but with an aim for public involvement





References

- Brattekås, K., Vincent, E. (2015). «D2.6 Report on Intentionally Caused Outbreaks», Action Plan on SiS Related Issues in Epidemics and Total Pandemics (ASSET) Consortium, EC Grant Agreement No. 612236
- Brattekås, K., Davidson, R.K. (2016), “Intentionally caused outbreaks: secrecy vs. transparency” in Asset paper series, Epidemics and Pandemics: The response of Society Issue No. 3, September - December 2016, National borders and the spreading of diseases, ISSN: 2532-3784

